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	Scott Sehon asserts that a Teleological explanations are the best way to explain actions and defends this view against possibly defeating criticisms. Sehon starts by outlining the essential parts of a Teleological explanation which are the agent, the agent's behavior, a teleological connective, and the state of affairs towards which the behavior was directed. Take the example, “Bob went to the store in order to get milk.” In this explanation Bob is the agent, Bob's going to the store is the agent's behavior, “in order to” is the teleological connective, and having milk is the state of affairs that bob's going to the store was directed at. A teleological connective is a phrase which states an explicit relation between an action and an intended state of affairs. “In order to,” “with the purpose of” or, “intending to” are all examples of teleological connectives. However, if “Bob went to the store because he wanted some milk,” or “because his wife told him to,” then the agent's behavior isn't explicitly related to a state of affairs. In the latter examples, if one does not know that the store sells milk, or that Bob wants to follow his wife's direction, then those explanations would fail to provide an adequate reason for Bob's going to the store. With a teleological connective however, no such additional knowledge is required. One can infer that the store sells milk, but it is not necessary to explain Bob's actions. 
	Sehon claims, fairly so I think, that most philosophers would agree with him in that, although many common sense explanations are already in teleological form, the ones which are not explicitly teleological, such as the wanting milk or following he wife's direction, can be plausibly construed as teleological. This is to say that “Bob went to the store because his wife wanted milk” can be, and generally is, construed as the teleological, “Bob went to the store to get milk.” If all explanations of actions are teleological or can be plausibly construed to be, then the true controversy, as Sehon points out, concerns weather or not explanations of actions are irreducibly teleological. If action explanations are irreducibly teleological, then they are not grounded in, or reducible to, any further facts. It also follows that if facts about teleology cannot be reduced into some other set of casual facts, then one cannot give definitive truth conditions for teleological explanations in non-teleological terms. This means that any further discussion of the agent's desire, at least as an explanation for the agent's action, is ultimately meaningless.
	Sehon classifies the objections to the view that action explanation is irreducibly teleological into two sorts, reductionist accounts and non-reductionist accounts. The reductionist accounts are actually parallel views which are teleological in nature but not irreducibly and therefore at odds with Sehon's view. The non-reductionist accounts are actual criticisms which pose objections directly to Sehon's account of action explanation.
	The first reductionist account of a teleological explanation for action, as with any Reason explanation, seeks to explain an individual behavior by referencing some end state of affairs the agent acts to bring about. In this view the action is explained as being designed by a designer (an agent) to bring about some state of affairs, much in the same way a hammer is designed by a designer to bring about some state of affairs, namely to hammer in a nail. Sehon argues that Darwinian biology shows that no designer is actually needed in this view. Natural Selection explains how incredibly complex organisms can arise out of extremely uncomplex organisms over time, without the need for an intelligent designer of any sort. If the reductionist account of the teleological explanation fails to offer any agency, then further discussion of action explanation is nonsense. Sehon points out that cats always arch their backs when they are afraid of something. This behavioral disposition found in all cats is the result of natural selection. The first cat to arch its back in fear likely survived longer and had more success reproducing more cats with the behavioral disposition to arch their backs in fear. At this point the question becomes, can we apply this natural selection approach to human behavior? Even though humans are as much a part of evolution as cats, many of our actions aim at some goal which seem to be in conflict with the goals of natural selection. Some behavioral dispositions we inherit may arguably have been, or may be, usefully, such as an affinity for a certain taste, or a reaction to a certain smell. A human's choice to use birth control, however cannot be said to be aimed at furthering successful possible reproduction. Sehon therefore concludes that such a reductionist approach to teleology is objectionable at best.
	The next reductionist view Sehon entertains is that posed by Donald Davidson in his (1963) article, “Actions, Reasons, and Desires”. Davidson asserts that standard reason explanations ought to be construed as causal explanations in which mental states of the agent are cited as the cause of the individual behavior. The example, “Bob went to the store to get milk.” can be construed as such, “Bob's desire for milk, and a belief that he can get some at the store, is what causes Bob to go to the store.” This causalist approach undermines the teleological element in reason explanation. If all teleological explanations of action can be reduced to discussion of mental states, then there is nothing truly teleological about them. Sehon dismisses this contrary view citing Davidson's own objection, the deviant causal chain. Consider a mountain climber who is holding another climber's rope whilst scaling a cliff side. The climber may desire to be rid the dangerous extra weight, and he may also believe that by dropping the other climber he can be rid the extra weight. This desire and belief might unnerve him so much that he loosens has grip on the rope and drops the other climber, though he never chose to let the rope go. In this case the climber's belief and desire caused the desired state of affairs, though the climber never intentionally let go. Thus something is missing from the causalist account. Although the causalist might argue that the causal chain was deviant in some way, and that genuinely goal oriented behavior requires the mental state cause the behavior in some specific correct way. At this point it falls on the causalist to define that correct way in causal terms, and this is is problem with deviant causal chains.
	The first non-reductionist objection Sehon defends against is the challenge posed by Davidson to any non-causal account of action explanation. Davidson pointed out that an agent may be justified in doing some action by two distinct reasons, but the agent only acts on one of them. For example “Bob goes to the gas station to put gas in his tank and grab a soda” Bob's one action, going to the gas station, can be explained by either his getting gas or grabbing a soda. For the causalist this is not a problem, whichever explanation describes the desire and belief which caused the action, is the reason. But how can the teleologist claim that Bob went to the gas station to put gas in his car when grabbing a soda is an equally good teleological explanation? Sehon responds to this challenge by pointing out that if agent's actions are directed at some goal, then we would expect to see, in similar counter-factual scenarios, the agent would still have acted towards that goal. Which means that if Bob were in a similar scenario in which he had the option of having gas delivered to him, then he would not go to the gas station; whereas if Bob were in a scenario in which he could only have soda delivered, he would still go to the gas station. This distinction, Sehon believes, defeats Davidson’s challenge. 
	The last challenge to the teleological explanation of action which Sehon entertains is the argument for parsimony, namely Occam's razor. This objection raises the point that an irreducible teleological explanation leaves no account of how the teleological account works. Unlike the causalist accounts which can explain explain how teleological explanations make sense by reducing them to further casual or selectional explanations, the irreducible teleological account does not offer any further explanation for how it can explain actions with reasons. Therefore the reductionist has less unexplained mysteries and ought to be preferable over the irreducibly teleological account which has more mysteries. Sehon responds to this by pointing out that the reductionist does not really have an account for why it works either, it only presupposes some further still unexplainable facts regarding the nature of teleological explanations. Without a definite successful recipe for reduction, there is no simplicity argument against non-reductionist views.
	I do not find Sehon's responses to the last two objections to be as resolute as he makes them out to be. Firstly, Sehon does not actually respond to Davidson's challenge appropriately, but rather offers an alternative method for deducing the agent's actionable reason which is not in conflict with the teleological explanation. The problem I find with this alternative method is that is assumes several premises which are difficult to know if knowable at all. The premises that Bob will still act towards state of affairs (A) rather then state of affairs (B) given a counter-factual scenario entails that we already know why Bob acted in the actual scenario, or else how would we know which state of affairs Bob would act towards or forget? Without already knowing that Bob's main reason for going to the store is to buy milk, then how can is be said that Bob would not go to the store if he could only buy eggs there and not milk? I believe that it cannot and Sehon has not actually defeated Davidson's challenge. 
	Sehon's response to the Occam's Razor challenge is also troubling. Sehon does not seem to deny that the causalist account leaves less unexplained mysteries than does the irreducibly teleological account. Instead he seems to be arguing against the rule of Occam's Razor as a whole. Sehon points out that the causalist account reduces the teleological explanation to further mental states which are the reasons for actions but that those mental states are not explainable or reducible to any further state or fact. For Sehon, this means that neither account offers an explanation which is without further unexplained mysteries, and therefore neither can be said to be more simplistic than the other. I would disagree with Sehon's conclusion and argue that the causalist account offers an answer to one of the unanswered mysteries left by the teleological account, namely what caused the action. Occam's Razor does not suggest that so long as any mysteries are left in a theory it should be disregarded, but rather that in the eventuality of two conflicting theories, whichever theory offers even one more answer than the other, then that theory ought to be preferred. Even Sehon agrees that the causalist offers a slightly more in-depth explanation of action. It should therefore, be preferable over the irreducible teleological account, on the grounds of parsimony.

